Armand’s Rancho Del Cielo: 8/1/12 – 9/1/12

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Last night, I got watching the National Geographic Channel saw for the very first time “Witness: Japan’s Disaster.” The video above is I saw. This program was on the fantastic East Japan Earthquake and resulting tsunami and Fukushima nuclear meltdown. I’ve seen footage in the disaster before, but this presentation was absolutely stunning. On March 11, 2011, a 9.0 magnitude earthquake struck 75 miles from the eastern coast of Japan. Almost immediately, tsunami warnings blared, urging residents along Japan’s coast to quickly proceed to higher ground. For another a long time, residents watched in stunned horror as some massive waves slammed in to the coast, inundating entire towns and sweeping over the countryside, laying waste to everything in its path. Throughout, amateur videographers, news crews, government agencies, tourists, and countless others were recording the sights and sounds of this unfolding catastrophe. Weaving together their footage, Witness: Japan’s Disaster reconstructs the earthquake and tsunami because they happened, entirely with the eyes of these who experienced them. The video shots with the tsunami were amazing. One aerial shot specifically was left a significant impression. It showed the tsunami rolling right into a coastal town, washing away buildings, cars and farmland. But in the perspective through the air, it appear to be it rolled in at slow motion.

Once you inserted them rather than reducing it since it was designed to.

50 Fascinating Nonprofit & Philanthropy StatisticsThere’s an extended laundry set of them, however the most frightening & most significant one in the context from the Chernobyl accident would be that the control rods which were designed to be placed in being an emergency shutdown mechanism once you wanted to turn off the reactor. Whether there is a crisis or not, or whether you merely wished to shut it down by the end of, for instance, the safety test. Could, they eventually discovered for a couple fractions of another increased reactivity within the core on the reactor. Once you inserted them rather than reducing it since it was designed to. It’s analogist to, you’re driving across the highway in an automobile and you also stomp in the brakes just because a deer leaps out before you, and rather than stopping the automobile suddenly, leaps forward and accelerates. CHRIS HAYES: Right. That the initial microsecond, the brake actually acts because the accelerator.

And so if you are really near something, you are going to smash involved with it. And in cases like this, you could have these boron rods. That is the chemical. The boron is placed into absorb the electrons which are bouncing around. ADAM HIGGINBOTHAM: To dampen the reactivity of this reactor. CHRIS HAYES: Right, to dampen. However they have on the end of these this graphite? ADAM HIGGINBOTHAM: Yeah. Which facilitates fishing. CHRIS HAYES: Exactly. When you pull all of them just how out, as soon as once the graphite tips are decreasing, that graphite is in fact accelerating? CHRIS HAYES: Which means this design flaw is discovered sooner or later because of the engineers who focus on this. ADAM HIGGINBOTHAM: At the latest by 1983, or perhaps before that. CHRIS HAYES: And what goes on compared to that discovery? ADAM HIGGINBOTHAM: The engineers who discover it, communicated with their bosses in Moscow, and their bosses in Moscow say, “Yeah, don’t worry, we’ll look after it.” And they don’t really. CHRIS HAYES: And it’s really not communicated to individuals who this exists. CHRIS HAYES: Here is a couple of stuff.

Tsunami Q Significa

And much like the rest of the design flaws of this reactor, nobody ever described towards the operators the importance of anybody of these issues with the reactor. So yes, there is a problem with it. But this is actually the Soviet Union and there have been design faults in everything. Therefore people got accustomed to working with problems that that they had to devise work arounds for, or they knew they didn’t work properly. The technology was old. Which means this is where in fact the normalization of deviance will come in, is basically because it’s area of the mythos of Chernobyl, how the operators on the reactor, the trained nuclear engineers were incompetent, and didn’t know very well what these were doing. That’s not true. This business are extremely experienced.

CHRIS HAYES: It isn’t just they’re experienced, because they’re coping with this machinery that is clearly a little like, I put an idea, I put these flashbacks to like once you watch just like a seventies’ movie and someone’s got a vintage car and they are looking to get it to start out plus they know the special trick of like, “Seriously, come on, seriously. There it goes.” They’re even super competent in the sense they learn how to massage and manage a not super smartly designed machine to obtain it to function. ADAM HIGGINBOTHAM: However, some of these tricks and work arounds were safety shortcuts and items that they knew they probably must not be doing. However, within the normalization of deviance, what goes on is that you have a thing that is quite risky and you also do it and you also get away along with it. Therefore that seems fine. So that it no more seems risky.